Carolin Emcke: A cordial welcome! My name is Carolin Emcke. I’m glad that I can welcome you to a new episode of “In aller Ruhe”, my podcast for the Süddeutsche Zeitung. My guest this time is Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger. I’ll be speaking with her about science and research in times of crisis, about the microcosm of the Wissenschaftskolleg, where researchers from all over the world come together and can’t help but bring with them the crises, the violence, and the history of the regions of their origins. But we’ll also talk about the meaning of truth and science in times of “post-truth” and about the freedom of research in the face of the war in the Middle East. – What have you experienced of the various crises of our time in the last few years in the microcosm of the Wissenschaftskolleg?

Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger: The world’s crises are automatically reflected in the Kolleg, because we have researchers from so many countries. For example, we invite Israeli Fellows every year, simply because very good research is done in Israel. But we also invite researchers from China. Of course, we have increased our invitations to Ukrainians and have launched a special program for them. The crises thus come more or less automatically to the Wissenschaftskolleg, because highly reflecting, politically interested, but also directly affected people come to us. Some of them suffer from political persecution or exclusion. This is true even of researchers from the United States, who repeatedly report to us about worrying political conditions and want to discuss them.

CE: The current “class” of 2023/2024 also includes a Russian author who went into exile in February 2022. At the same time, you say that there are an increased number of Ukrainian researchers at the Kolleg. What do lunches or colloquia look like? Do you simply host guests who have experienced differing histories of persecution and then simply live and conduct research in proximity to each other, or are such experiences really brought to discussion? 

BStR: It’s almost unavoidable. For one, some of the Fellows conduct research on highly political topics. For example, a Chinese Fellow who no longer lives in China is working on how the Tian’anmen Massacre is remembered. And two years ago, we had a Russian Fellow who no longer lives in Russia and who conducted research on Putin’s cultural policy. And second, politics are a topic of discussion every day at the tables of our restaurant.

CE: So it’s not the case that one group sits at one table and the others at another table? Maybe the lines of conflict at the Wissenschaftskolleg run not only between nationalities or political camps, but between disciplines. 

BStR: Yes, the various research cultures often have greater problems understanding each other than do people who come from different parts of the world. But everything mixes as time passes. For example, we had several Ukrainians here and at the same time two Russian Fellows who no longer work in Russia. We were skeptical about whether they would talk with each other. Then another Russian exile, the writer Maxim Osipov, was added; he had left Russia on short notice because he had signed an open letter against the war. At first there were definitely slight reservations. The Ukrainians didn’t want to hear, much less speak any Russian, though they all do. But as far as I could observe, this eventually vanished completely, also because the Russian writer approached the Ukrainians and showed great understanding for their stance. It was similar last year. We had an exiled Russian writer, Maria Stepanova, and by chance one of our Ukrainian guests Marianna Kiyanovska, a poet, was her translator. So in a way they were the ideal Fellow duo. 

CE: The question arose at literature and music festivals not only in Germany, but also in the United States and France: What can one expect of Ukrainian artists? Did such discussions unfold at the Wissenschaftskolleg: How and from whom should one distance oneself? What is legitimate here?

BStR: Yes, there were such discussions. And of course we didn’t want to demand from the Ukrainians, who had just fled and were often traumatized, that they muster a tolerance that we as Germans who are not affected might all too thoughtlessly expect. We didn’t want to impose any expectations on them. But it turned out that in the Kolleg, where, unlike at a festival, most of the encounters do not take place on a stage, distance and distancing can dissolve with time. In the public eye, of course, that is very different. I remember a very pertinent experience. Shortly after the beginning of the Russian invasion, Germany’s Federal President invited people to a solidarity concert by the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra in Bellevue Palace. The orchestra was the host and Ukrainian refugees were invited, including from our group. I also brought along our Russian opponent of Putin, of whom we just spoke. It was very sad to see that the Ukrainian ambassador of the time regarded the solidarity concert as a slap in the face of the Ukrainians because one or two Russian soloists also performed. Present was also the Ukrainian composer Valentin Sylvestrov, who was our guest at the time and had even composed a kind of unofficial Ukrainian national anthem. He was the reason we were invited in the first place. I thought it was sad that the ambassador rejected such a gesture of solidarity. But it’s easy for me to say that. Of course we wouldn’t invite any Putin-supporters. But to invite Russian dissidents is definitely our policy. In the end, of course, people from the attacked country can choose for themselves with whom they want to sit at a table. 

CE: Does that also go for Fellows invited from China? From Iran? From Israel? 

BStR: Yes. Currently, the Middle East conflict cannot be bracketed away anywhere. It dominates the debate, everywhere, at every table. This year (2023/2024), by chance, we have two Israeli Fellows and also some Jewish Fellows from various other countries, but neither a Palestinian nor another Arab Fellow. We have an Iranian filmmaker, but as someone persecuted by the Iranian regime, she was welcomed with open arms and great solidarity by the Israeli Fellows. Back when I was a Fellow myself, a couple was invited: he was a Palestinian human rights attorney and she was a Jewish American. At that time there were no problems at all. Of course, I can’t judge how that would be today. In 2024/2025, Israeli, Jewish, and Palestinian Fellows will all be here. All of them were invited well in advance, before October 7, 2023. We will see how that develops.

CE: How does the Middle East conflict become a topic? What is the discussion culture like? How are the sympathies apportioned? 

BStR: Currently, as I mentioned, we have two Israeli Fellows, both of whom are coincidentally working on very relevant topics: the Israeli anthropologist Michal Kravel-Tovi, who works on Jewish identity in America, and Omri Boehm, who is working on universalism and Israeli statehood and is currently present on many podiums and has won the Leipzig Book Award for European Understanding. Michal, who was personally affected by the October 7 attack, didn’t initially want to talk publicly about it, because it was too close. But after a few weeks we organized a public panel discussion with the two of them and tried to treat the issue on a more descriptive level. The big question of how the Middle East conflict can be resolved was thereby not addressed. But the effects of the October 7 attack on the people in Israel and their relationship with the state and the government was described. In principle, we assume that conflicts can and must be discursively approached. In this sense, the Wissenschaftskolleg is a privileged institution, of course, because here we have a mass of people who are fundamentally convinced that problems can be rationally discussed and that one should adduce reasons and arguments. We are thus not in a position, as is unfortunately increasingly the case in the public sphere, in which one has to expect that people suddenly shout or possibly even physically attack each other or take positions that cannot be regarded as expressions of opinion, but only as hate speech. Outside of the Kolleg, that does happen to our Fellows: an American Jewish colleague walked home from the synagogue with his family. On Koenigsallee, a few adolescent louts encircled them and gave the Hitler salute.

CE: Adolescent louts? That’s a fairly harmless description. It could also be called an appalling antisemitic assault.

BStR: Absolutely. That these were 13- or 14-year-olds is no excuse at all, of course. We filed charges about the event and went with the Fellow to the police, where he gave his statement. I was greatly pleased that he made an extraordinarily positive remark about the German chief inspector, who took the case very seriously.

CE: Do Fellows – who are your guests from the widest variety of regions of the world – experience racism in public often? How do the Fellows reflect German society?

BStR: That is the only case I personally know about. I think that the Fellows have a limited perception of Germany, because we live in a relatively protected space here, in a well-to-do neighborhood, where incidents like the one I just described are very rare. I think most of our Fellows go home with a mostly positive image of Berlin and Germany. Almost every year, we have Fellows who are the descendants of expellees or Holocaust victims and who are seeking their roots here. Some of them even take on German citizenship. We here can help with their research and the procedures.

CE: In recent years in many countries in the world, we are experiencing strong contestation of the methodology developed by the Enlightenment, the standards of science, and the criteria of truth. Can you say what you have observed of these developments in the last few years?

BStR: That is a broad issue and one can’t feel any other way than that it is quite threatening. Of course there are very different threats to freedom of research, external ones and internal ones. And they take very different forms in different countries. To bring them into some kind of order, we could start with the countries that have no freedom of research. Unfortunately, this now also includes an EU country like Hungary. Certainly, science still has some freedoms there. But as soon as the government only deigns to grant slight freedoms, as far as I’m concerned there is no freedom of research anymore. Then there are countries in which the freedom of research is only partially limited, for example here with us and markedly more so in the United States. The threat comes from two sides. On the one hand, from above, from the state, when certain fields or researches are no longer financially supported. On the other hand from the inside, when groups in scientific institutions exercise pressure.

CE: Could you name some examples of that?

BStR: In some states governed by the Republicans in the United States, Gender Studies have been squeezed out of the institutions of higher learning. Books on Critical Race Theory have been removed from public libraries. It’s disastrous that in some places it is demanded that universities or schools teach “Creationism” on a level equal to that of the theory of evolution. Then there is something I consider a worrisome development that I’d call identitary, namely the idea that the position one has as speaker is decisive for the validity of what one says. In a caricaturistic oversimplification: only people of color may conduct research on people of color.

CE: Maybe we can speak without a caricature. It’s my impression that in this discussion, freedom of research and freedom of speech are mustered against recognizing the structures of disrespect, the recognition of racist structures, or the recognition of historical injustice. 

BStR: Yes, that’s true.

CE: How would you describe it without a caricature?

BStR: I can give an example. When someone says, for example, “Aristotle was a misogynist and a proponent of slavery; so we don’t want to deal with Aristotle anymore.” I consider that absolutely absurd, because we can’t simply learn about history what corresponds with today’s moral standards.

CE: Of course we have to deal with Aristotle! And not although he took positions that we consider ethically inacceptable today, but precisely because he did so. One question is: Do we judge historical texts or figures by today’s political or ethical standards? And the other question is: Are positions or arguments or texts that are antisemitic, racist, or homophobe nonetheless interesting? Are they necessary for a more precise understanding of what racism or misogyny is?

BStR: We mustn’t make topics fundamentally taboo, but of course at the same time we must always observe the basic principle of treating each other with respect and of taking clearly articulated sensitivities into consideration. For me it is absolutely clear that today certain words should not be uttered, if one knows that the person in question regards them as hurtful. That’s self-explanatory. But that doesn’t mean that the use of these words must be expunged from history. (…)

CE: Still there is a level of stupidity, viciousness, or manipulative rhetoric that I have no desire to dignify with a response. This kind of discussion doesn’t lead to any increase in knowledge, and it threatens to establish a form of normalization. There are limits to what I consider worthy of discussion.

BStR: We are in total agreement on that. That’s why, for example, I’m not present in the social media, because I simply can’t endure it. But we are speaking about freedom of research, about the protected space of science, and about the willingness in this space to talk about every topic, no matter how unpleasant. Otherwise no one could write any more books about Adolf Hitler. But in the realm of science, that always means arguing with certain standards, on the basis of empirical evidence, etc. I’d like to mention another topic that often leads to conflicts: around the term “gender” I observe a huge problem of mutual understanding among the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences, one that is also politically exploited. The Wissenschaftskolleg is an outstanding place to identify this misunderstanding in the first place and to ask: Could the other academic culture possibly have a point? We set up what we call the Three Cultures Forum, where representatives of the three great academic cultures can exchange views. With the terms “sex” and “gender”, the discussion is especially virulent, of course. Where are the limits of biological determinacy and where does cultural construction begin? And it is really interesting to see which arguments the biologists or the cultural anthropologists bring to the field. This was also fruitful with the term “race”. In the meantime, word has spread that the biologists don’t think there is anything to the category “race”. They regard it as clear that races are constructed and that there are no biological facts underlying the category, as a layperson might think. Such misunderstandings can be clarified in rational discussion, curiosity about the other side can be developed, and discussants can gradually work toward the point where actually differing interests or differing political stances may lie.

CE: I like that you said “gradually”, because I consider that one of the essential preconditions for a reasonable culture of discussion. Understanding is simply also work. It takes time. It’s best not to make judgments ad hoc. But let me ask a related question: How many speech rules, but also maybe also how many legal regulations are needed to fence in hate speech and antisemitic, racist, and homophobic resentments? And vice versa: How much discourse is needed, how much debate? 

BStR: It’s a balancing act. On the one hand, it is absolutely essential to counter all the group-specific inhumane expressions you just mentioned. But with means that actually help. That is, with the means of the Enlightenment, with the means of education. Prohibitions can be abused all too easily; a lot of political mischief can be done with them. There is always the danger that, when one defends freedom of speech and freedom of research, one means only one’s own and not that of the opposing group. And that’s wrong. Concretely, I see a problem in implementing prohibitions, even with the good and important intention of doing something against the massive increase in antisemitism; it opens the gates for people who exploit them with entirely other intentions than to combat antisemitism.

CE: You mean the AfD party?

BStR: Yes. There are obvious antisemites in the AfD. And the current political tendency to blur the boundary between “criticism of Israel” and antisemitism comes in extremely handy for the AfD. This tendency already leads to absurd effects, for example when Jewish artists are affected by limitations or the withdrawal of funding. 

CE: What does “criticism of Israel” mean in this context? Does it mean criticizing Israel as a whole or questioning its right to exist? Or is it about concrete political measures by the government, for example the warfare in Gaza? In this context, we must mention the specific definition of antisemitism promulgated by the International Holocaust Remembrance Association. I would like to ask if its problem lies in too broad a definition, because through it criticism of government action in Israel can be declared antisemitic. Or is the problem more fundamental? Isn’t it fundamentally problematic that the German government provides a substantive definition of antisemitism and can then say: those who don’t follow this definition cannot receive funding. Guests who don’t subordinate themselves to this definition cannot be invited. Shouldn’t the invasiveness of the state be criticized, when it seeks to govern in a field of research?

BStR: Despite all understanding of the struggle against group-related inhumanity – it is wrong for politics to present research with definitions and to demand avowals. I think that, in Berlin, behind the current discussion of a stipulation regulating the cultural sector is the Senate bureaucracy’s desire to protect itself after the scandal surrounding the documenta exhibition. They wanted to be able to say: The people we are sponsoring have checked off the box that they are not inhumane! But that’s not acceptable – fundamentally not. I can only speak for science and scholarship, though, who are not affected, yet. No matter how much effort one might put into it, it would be completely unproductive to specify a definition as a standard to which researchers must adhere. In research contexts, definitions are always working instruments, not ultimate truths. They must always be contestable and subject to correction, like all scientific statements, which is precisely what makes them scientific. Otherwise what we have are quasi-religious dogmas. 

CE: We have recently experienced several situations in which scientists, writers, and artists are cancelled – most recently at the Berlinale film festival, and before that Masha Gessen in regard to the Hannah Arendt Award. And now, taking the most recent example of the Berlinale, the film crew returned to Israel and were massively threatened there because they were publicly suspected of antisemitism. If we consider these various cases, which are surely very differently structured, then it is necessary and worthwhile to view them individually very precisely, and, yes, gradually. But in foreign countries the worry is growing whether it is still at all advisable to come to Germany for a lecture or a festival. The risk of being publicly discredited, exposed, or branded here is quite high. Do you already hear that in the Kolleg, too? How do you deal with it?

BStR: So far, fortunately not. I mean, we have the totally grotesque situation that, on the one hand, people have to be afraid of being antisemitically attacked in Germany and, on the other hand, they have to worry that they could be discredited as antisemites. That is an absurd situation, of course, that can be explained in part by German history, but it is nonetheless not acceptable. That is not the right path, because we thereby actually only want to deal with – or as we sometimes put it, overcome – our own guilt, and that in a way that I regard as a moral arrogance. Ultimately, in Germany we take a stance of moral superiority and reproach Jewish colleagues, of all people. We demand of them that they fulfill German ideas. Of course that doesn’t apply solely to Jewish colleagues, but even more so to Muslim or Palestinian colleagues. I consider that an arrogance.

CE: The idea that one could overcome German history is already the fundamental error, that German guilt could be worked away somehow. Nor do I think there is something like a “use-by” date for memory. It obligates us anew in each generation. Against this background, we have to endure the debates about the Middle East conflict. I think there are no shortcuts here. To me, the problem seems to be the idea that certain positions must not be audible in public. I want for us to be able to discuss, and that with international norms, with terms that are given to us, and that we can make meaningful comparisons. That brings us further in the debate, or it takes us away from it, but not comparing per se or the use or testing of a single term. What are you really risking when you invite someone of whom you know that he or she will advocate a position that has to expect a lot of criticism? Do you look in the social media to see whether the invited person has just expressed themselves about the Middle East? Do you check for connections to the BDS movement? How do you prepare for the reproach that you invited such a position into your institution? What do you advise other cultural institutions to do? 

BStR: That is a very difficult question that can’t be answered abstractly and in general. It is really a judgment of the individual case. Thank God we haven’t been in this situation yet. But of course that doesn’t mean it can’t happen to us. Fundamentally, the Wissenschaftskolleg must remain a protected space. We are not entirely public, like a university where students and the public are admitted to everything; rather, we can to some extent control how public we want to be. This open space, this safe space, must be preserved, and positions that we do not share must be allowed to be expressed here. Whether we offer a public stage or not is an entirely different question. I’d be very careful about that. After all, one must oneself be able to talk with one or the other AfD member; but we wouldn’t place them on a public stage in the Wissenschaftskolleg.

CE: So there are limits to what can be said, after all. There are antidogmatic standards. And that begins with the standard of being able to accept criticism. Am I dealing here with a position or a person with whom I can discuss, despite critical objections? Or am I confronted with a resentment-loaded, dogmatic prevention of thinking? 

BStR: Freedom of research is not limitless, no question about that at all. And, like all other freedoms, freedom of research is not isolated or absolute, but always limited by other freedoms. There is this scientific self-conception that a researcher cannot simply deny a statement, but must be able to give reasons for his objections. That is the core of the scientific ethos. In the end, of course, every norm is characterized by being capable of being violated. But at least as a norm it must be shared by a majority. But we live in a time when certain basic norms are no longer shared. That includes the norm that one calls a lie a lie and tries to distinguish between a lie and the truth. If this idea is no longer shared and it doesn’t matter if one lies, even though it’s obvious that one is lying, then there is no common basis anymore. At the Wissenschaftskolleg, that hasn’t happened yet; in that sense, we are not very “diverse”.

CE: It was important to me that we pin that down again here. Thank you very much, Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, and many thanks to the whole team of the Süddeutsche Zeitung.

You can listen to the unabridged podcast “Definitions are not ultimate truths” of the Süddeutsche Zeitung in German here.